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Is the EU’s Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) with Mauritania a genuine partnership or a cover for 
exploitation by the EU? 
 
Abstract  
 
The EU’s fisheries agreements with West African states have long been criticized by NGOs for exporting the 
EU’s problem of over-exploiting its own fish stocks to African waters. To meet these criticisms, the EU 
introduced in 2003 a new form of fisheries agreement, the Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA), replacing 
purely commercial deals with a commitment to sharing decision-making with the African states to sustainably 
develop their fisheries. However, some critics claim that despite the EU’s good intentions, little has changed: the 
partnerships are dominated by the EU, and the fish stocks in the African states’ waters are still being over-fished 
to serve the needs of the EU, not the African states. In this paper, the working of the FPA between the EU and 
Mauritania is investigated to determine whether a genuine partnership has been established, or whether the FPA 
is a thinly disguised form of EU exploitation, using the fashionable model of partnership as a cover or mask. 
The findings are that while the FPA is a significant improvement on the EU’s previous fisheries relationship 
with Mauritania, it falls short of a genuine partnership, and it needs several reforms if it is to meet not only its 
own specifications of what constitutes the FPA, but also wider, aspirational notions of the essence of 
partnership.     
 
Keywords: Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA); EU; Mauritania; partnerships; over-fishing  
 
1. Introduction    
 
The EU imports nearly 60% of its fish consumption because it can no longer meet domestic demand from the 
fish in its own waters (Gorez 2006). Moreover, there is a surplus of fishing vessels in many EU Member States 
because owners are unable to obtain sufficient quota under the strict quota rules imposed by the EU’s Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP). Accordingly, the European Commission has negotiated agreements with many 
developing countries to allow EU fishing vessels access to the fish stocks in their exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs) in return for compensation payments and favourable terms for the developing countries to export their 
fish to EU Member States (Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002: 76). These agreements arose after the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) extended national jurisdictions (EEZs) out to 200 miles in 1979 
in order to help developing countries protect their coastal resources for their own benefit (Renton 2008) – a 
move that overnight placed most (90%) of the marine fisheries in the world within the authority of coastal 
countries, and excluded fishing vessels registered in EU Member States which had long fished in these waters 
with relative impunity (Gorez 2006).  
 
The EU fisheries agreements with developing countries before 2003 were criticised for being heavily weighted 
in favour of the EU. For example, Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002: 75) claimed that the agreements were 
“designed to maximise access to coastal state fisheries resources, secure employment for European harvesting 
and processing industries and supply European seafood consumption markets at the lowest possible cost”, and 
that the agreements caused over-fishing of the developing countries’ fisheries resources. With remarkable 
candour, the EU’s Directorate General for Fishing (DG Fish) acknowledged the validity of these criticisms 
(Gorez 2006), and as part of the 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), attempted to deal with 
them by introducing a fisheries partnership approach with a strong emphasis on promoting the sustainable 
development of the fisheries in the West African countries (Witbooi 2008; EC 2011). As the European 
Commission put it (quoted in Fishing News 7/11/08: 8), “With the reform of the CFP in 2002, the agreements 
we have with these countries have undergone a transformation. What were once access arrangements with a 
financial contribution have now become genuine partnerships for the development of sustainable and 
responsible fisheries. The idea is to help the third countries to put in place their own fisheries policies that can 
help them meet their aim of economic development while protecting fish resources”. This new partnership 
policy was rolled out incrementally from 2003, and the EU now has 19 FPAs, six of them with West African 
states - Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Sao Tome e Principe (Obaidullah and 
Osinga (2010) - the most important of which is with Mauritania. There are two forms of FPAs: the first consists 
of tuna agreements; the second consists of multi-species or ‘mixed’ agreements, including the Mauritanian FPA 
(Dziemballa 2011; EU Fact Sheet n. d.).  
 
However, some critics have complained that the new partnerships are merely cosmetic facelifts. For example, 
Cullberg and Lövin (2009: 2) remarks that “Though the partnership sounds good in theory, and criticism of the 
agreements has diminished, there are still very strong reasons to question whether these agreements promote 
sustainable use of marine resources and whether the development aspects of the agreements are satisfactorily 
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met in reality”. But in 2009, the EU robustly defended itself against such criticism, claiming that while the FPAs 
are not perfect,  they can make an important contribution to the country’s fishery sector and to its overall 
development goals (EC 2009). 
 
In this paper, the EU-Mauritania FPA is examined to determine whether it is a genuine partnership or a cosmetic 
facelift. Section 2 sets out the theoretical framework that guides the paper – the concept of partnership – and 
outlines the sources of data used in the research. Section 3 describes the case study of the EU-Mauritanian FPA. 
Section 4 examines six controversial issues for the EU in its handling of the EU-Mauritania FPA. Section 5 
discusses the value of the EU-Mauritanian FPA and rehearses recommendations that have been made for its 
reform or replacement. The concluding section summarises the findings of the paper.    
 
2. Theoretical framework and methodology 
 
2.1 Concept of ‘partnership’ 
 
The theoretical framework guiding this paper is the concept of ‘partnership’, which, as Slocum-Bradley and 
Bradley (2010) note, was introduced into the arena of development strategies to denote a progression from the 
traditionally top-down or vertical relationship between developed and developing countries to a new cooperative 
or horizontal relationship in which the developing country assumes greater ownership of the way in which the 
partnership is implemented (Johnson and Wilson 2006). Gunningham (2007: 15) points out that “environmental 
partnerships”, virtually unheard of before the 1990s, were designed to get rid of the adversarial attitude which 
characterised traditional relations between environmental stakeholders. During the last 10-20 years, there has 
been an explosion of partnership arrangements (Martens 2007; Biermann et al. 2007b), not least because of their 
positive normative resonance denoting mutually shared goals and collaboration on the basis of equality 
(Meadowcroft 2007). 
 
The FPA is a partnership between a supra-governmental authority (the EU) and a sovereign government (in this 
case Mauritania), for their mutual advantage. It is different from a bilateral aid agreement between governments, 
in that it is a partnership – ie a two-way arrangement for mutual advantage, not a one-way flow of assistance. 
The FPA is also different from a bilateral trade agreement between governments in that it seeks to achieve a 
public good – the sustainable development of Mauritania’s fishing resources – not simply economic gains for 
EU and Mauritanian fleets. Finally, the FPA is different from the wide-ranging 20-year partnership agreement 
(Cotonou Agreement) negotiated in 2000 between the EU and the members of the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) Group of States, which affirmed a commitment to work collaboratively to reduce poverty; 
achieve sustainable development; integrate the ACP countries into the international economic system; help to 
achieve security and peace; and build capacity for social cohesion, an organised civil society, a market 
economy, political stability, and democratisation. The ACP partnership also laid down extensive criteria for its 
own working, including equality between the partners, local ownership of the development strategies, 
stakeholder participation, and good governance (EU-ACP 2000). By contrast, the Explanatory Memorandum of 
the 2006 FPA between the EU and Mauritania gave the FPA a much more circumscribed remit of “creating a 
framework of partnership in which to develop a sustainable fisheries policy and sound exploitation of fisheries 
resources in the Mauritanian fishing zone, in the interests of both parties…[and] economic, scientific and 
technical cooperation in the fisheries sector and related sectors” (COM 2006). 
 
Annex IV of the 2008 FPA set out four ‘strategic priorities’; 15 ‘objectives’; and 53 ‘performance indicators’. 
The four strategic priorities were “fisheries management and rent optimisation; increased economic and social 
impact of the sector; protection of the marine environment, habitats and the coastline; and reform of the legal 
and institutional framework”, under which were set out the following 15 objectives:  sustainable fisheries 
management; stepping-up of fisheries and oceanographic research; stepping-up of fisheries surveillance; 
control and adjustment of capacities; development of new fisheries; development of port infrastructure and 
services; restructuring of Mauritania’s industrial fleet; modernisation and health and hygiene upgrade of its 
non-industrial fleet; improvement of the quality of fisheries products (products landed and processed brought 
into line with health and hygiene standards); development of non-industrial maritime fisheries, inland fisheries 
and aquaculture; promotion of private investment in the sector; conservation of the marine environment and 
aquatic habitats; increase in capacity for analysing and combating marine pollution; reinforcement of staff 
training; improving the effectiveness of the technical services of the Ministry of Fisheries and the services 
involved in managing the sector; and stepping-up of monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the 
strategy (steering of the system)”. The 53 performance indicators were specific tests of whether these objectives 
had been met.   
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2.2 Methodology 
 
Data for this paper were obtained from several sources, mainly documentary. Four interviews were conducted 
with key informants (representatives from an EU-based NGO; a German-based NGO; the European pelagic 
fishery sector; and the European Commission’s DG MARE), while other interview material was acquired by 
correspondence and from newspapers and newsletters. Official archives were used to access fisheries 
agreements and their Protocols. European Commission and European Parliament files provided statements on 
EU fisheries policy as well as official statistics. West African country government files supplied information on 
national negotiations with the EU’s DG Fisheries. Websites of NGOs were accessed for reports on FPAs. 
Fisheries science research organizations were used for data bases, while trade newspapers, academic journals 
and books provided critical analyses of the nature and outcomes of EU-West African fisheries agreements in 
general and the EU-Mauritanian FPA in particular. The focus of the paper is concentrated on the effectiveness 
of the FPA in delivering the four ‘strategic priorities’ in Annex IV of the 2008 FPA 
 
3. The case of Mauritania  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Atlantic, Eastern Central (Major Fishing Area 34) (Source: FAO Fishstat plus C/CECAF, modified by Philipp 
Nagel) 
 
3.1 The fisheries in Mauritania 
 
Mauritania’s position on the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) is 140th out of 179; and 46% of its 
population lives below the poverty line (CFFA 2006). Because of droughts and attempts to reduce poverty, the 
country has built up a large external debt, resulting in its classification as a Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
(HIPC), and the economy remains one of the least developed in the world (Martin 2010). With a 754 km long 
western coastline bordering the Atlantic Ocean containing rich coastal fishing resources (Kaczynski 1989), 
Mauritania is very dependent on the fishing industry from which it derives 10% of its GDP, 25% of its annual 
government budget, over 40% of its foreign currency (Obaidullah and Osinga 2010), and 45,000 of its jobs 
(Martin 2010). Total catches in the Mauritanian EEZ rose from about 50,000t pa in the 1970s to about 500,000t 
pa (or 700,000t pa including estimates of unrecorded fishing) during the 1980s, but have since declined to about 
350,000t pa (Gascuel et al. 2007). In 1970, domestic vessels’ catches accounted for 10% of all catches made in 
Mauritanian waters, but now account for half of the total catch volume and around 55% of its value.  
 
There are two parts to the Mauritanian domestic fishing industry, the industrial fleet and the small-scale fleet 
(Martin 2010). The industrial fleet consists of 140 bottom trawlers (94 of which are freezer trawlers) and takes 
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90% of the total domestic catch by volume but provides few jobs and limited added value. It targets demersal 
species, especially octopus, hake, shrimp, and crawfish. The small-scale fleet consists of over 4,000 vessels or 
pirogues, operating in shallow water (less than 20m deep) within 6 miles of the shore, and targets both demersal 
species (i.e., octopus and demersal fish) and small pelagic species (i.e., sardinella) (Gascuel et al (2007). The 
catch of the small-scale sector was 86,000 tonnes in 2002 but has since declined. Fresh products are airlifted 
from Nouadhibou to the Iberian Peninsula, though most of the exports are frozen octopus sent to the Japanese  
market because of its higher prices than the European market (especially from the small-scale sector which uses 
selective gear to preserve the quality of the product). Lack of finance has hampered the development of ports 
and processing facilities, which in turn has prevented the industrial fisheries sector from meeting product 
standards for export markets (Martin 2010).   
 
3.2 The EU-Mauritania FPA 
 
Payments by the EU to Mauritania under the FPA, which is by far the largest of all the EU’s FPAs, during 2008-
12 amounted to a total of €86 m., €76 m., €73 m., and €70 m. for the first, second, third and fourth years 
respectively. The payments are divided into three categories (see Figure 2). First is a sum in return for access by 
110 EU vessels from 12 Member States to the Mauritanian EEZ. This is the largest payment, though it has been 
decreasing in both absolute and relative terms from the mid-2000s onwards. Second is a sum earmarked for 
(among other objectives) the country’s national strategy for the sustainable development of its fisheries sector, 
and in the 2008-2012 FPA it was €11 m., €16., €18 m., and €20 m., in respective years. Third is a sum made up 
of licence fees paid by EU vessel owners. Depending on the number of licences granted to EU vessels these fees 
have ranged between €16.6 m (accounting year 2008-09) and €20.4 m (2007-08). However, in reality not all of 
the granted fishing opportunities have been used. For example only 74% of the licenses granted for the category 
of crustaceans were used in 2008-2010 whereas all licenses were used for the category of cephalopods (Martin 
2010). The fishing opportunities for EU vessels paid for by these sums are strictly set out in the FPA. For 
example in the 2008-12 FPA, under the four categories of crustacean, demersal, cephalod, and pelagic fisheries, 
it was stipulated that the annual allowable takes were as follows: (1) crustaceans – crab 300 GT [gross tonnes] 1; 
spiny lobster 300 GT; and other crustaceans 9,570 GT; (2) demersal – black hake by trawlers and longliners 
3,240 GT; other demersals with non-trawl gear 1,162 GT and with trawlers 375 GT; cephalods -  13,950 GT 
restricted to 22 vessels; and pelagic – tuna seiners 22 vessels; tuna pole and liners and longliners 22 vessels; 
pelagic freezer trawlers 17 vessels; and pelagic non-freezer vessels 15,000 GT per month.  
  
                                                          
1
 Until the 2006 agreement, fishing licences for the Mauritanian EEZ were granted to the EU in Gross Register Tonnage 
(GRT) for some fishing categories and in the number of vessels for others. With the 2006 Agreement the unit of 
measurement GRT was replaced with the unit Gross Tonnage (GT). A direct inference from GRT to GT is impossible since 
vessels are reassessed by using different criteria in order to calculate the GT value. 
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Figure 2: Payments of the EU and vessel owners from the EU to Mauritania as arranged in the respective Protocols of the 
fishery agreements for each year (August to July), (The indicated vessel owner contribution is the maximum amount that 
would have been paid in the event that all licences were used) (Source: Fishery Agreements and Protocols between the EU 
and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania) 
 
4.  Six issues for the EU in its handling of the EU-Mauritania FPA 
 
There are six controversial issues about the way the EU has handled the EU-Mauritania FPA. These issues are 
compensation; subsidies; sustainability; compliance; development of the Mauritanian fishing industry; and good 
governance.  
 
4.1 Compensation (Strategic Priority 1: ‘Fisheries management and rent optimization’) 
 
The negotiations for the 2006-2012 Agreement revealed a huge discrepancy between the payment that the EU 
offered (€83 million pa) and the payment demanded by Mauritania (€150 million), though the agreed figure 
(€86 million pa) was much closer to the EU’s preference (InshoreIreland 2007 and Worldfishing & Aquaculture 
2006-2010). Furthermore, it was stated by a representative of the European Commission (Interview 4 2010) that 
for the post-2012 agreement the EU is unlikely to offer such high payments as they did for the current 
agreement. The splitting of the compensation into the three categories of access dues, earmarked financial 
support, and licence fees is also controversial. Earmarked payments have been increased by 21.2 % between the 
end of the 1996-2001 fisheries agreements and the end of the current FPA. It was stated by a representative of 
the European Commission (Interview 4) that this increase represents the partnership component of the post-2002 
agreements. Table 1 indicates the envisaged purposes of the earmarked payments between 1987 and 2012, from 
which it is clear that since 2002, an increasing amount of money has been dedicated to the strategy of 
sustainable development of Mauritania’s fishery sector. However, the influence of the EU on the spending of the 
earmarked financial support is unclear. Several sources claim that the money generated from the agreements has 
not been invested in the fishery sector (Interview 1; Cullberg and Lövin 2009). A representative of the European 
Commission (Interview 4 2010) stated that in 2009/2010 the earmarked payments were not transferred to the 
Fisheries Ministry of Mauritania but instead remained at the Treasury Department. It is stated in the 2008-2012 
Protocol that Mauritania has the sovereign right to decide how to make use of any payments made to it (EU & 
IRM 2008). However, the Minister of Fisheries of Mauritania (after the coup d’etat in 2008) conceded that 
although the government had full sovereignty over the payments derived from the agreements, the country was 
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open for a dialogue with the EU to ensure that earmarked payments benefited the fisheries sector (Cullberg and 
Lövin (2009).  
 
 
Table 1: Purposes of the earmarked financial support in million EUR as determined in the protocols of the various fishery 
agreements (Some purposes were aggregated to a higher level. The X indicates that the exact amount was not indicated in 
detail but that the “X total amount” in the second last column should be utilized for all purposes tagged with an X)  (Source: 
Fishery Agreements between the EU and Mauritania between 1987 and 2012, author’s compilation)  
 
 
 
 
4.2 Subsidies (Strategic Priority 2: ‘Increased social and economic impact of the sector’) 
 
The controversy over subsidies to EU vessels is that they undermine the indigenous fishing industry. A report by 
Oceana (2011) claims that the annual EU subsidies to the EU fishing industry currently total €3.3bn, which 
includes €57.1 million in payment of access dues for vessels fishing in Mauritania’s EEZ (see Table 2). As 
Interviewee 1 (2010) pointed out, subsidies “basically...keep vessels operating that…would not be profitable 
otherwise”. One critic said that “We now have the ridiculous situation that the EU is…subsidising its fishermen 
to compete against the fishermen of a developing nation” (quoted in Obaidullah and Osinga 2010: 5. However, 
this access subsidy has been reduced since 2006, and by 2020 the access due is planned to be covered entirely 
by vessel owners.   
  
Table 2: Share of Access Due, Earmarked Payments and License Fees on overall compensation to Mauritania in the 
framework of the EU-Mauritanian FAs in between 1996 and 2012 (Source: Fishery Agreements between the EU and 
Mauritania between 1996 and 2012, compiled by Philipp Nagel) 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
4.3 Sustainability (Strategic Priority 3: ‘Protection of the marine environment, habitats and the coastline’) 
 
The controversy over sustainability under the FPA is about the long-term future of Mauritania’s fisheries 
resources, in that EU vessels have been accused of over-exploiting the stocks, especially octopus, on which 
stock IMROP and the FPA’s Scientific Committee estimated an excessive capacity of around 31% in 2006 
(Pechecops/Cape 2006) and recommended in 2008 that the fishing effort on octopus should be reduced by 30 %. 
A decision to reduce the number of cephalopod licences was taken in the 2008-2012 Protocol, but significantly, 
before this official reduction, 20 of the Spanish cephalopod vessels had to stop their activities due to a decline in 
profitability (Pechecops/Cape 2008): indeed, only 65 % of the GT of the allocated cephalopod licenses were 
used during the 2006-2008 period (Martin 2010). This is a reflection of the dire condition of the octopus stock 
levels, according to the chairman of the Pecheurs Artisanaux Nord (PAN: the artisanal fishers of northern 
Mauritania), Sid ‘Ahmed Mohamed Abeid, who alleged in an interview in 2009 that EU boats were 
undermining the artisanal octopus fishery: “We are completely against Mauritania having an agreement with the 
EU for fishing octopus! It is strategically important for the small-scale fisheries which employ 25,000 people. 
Besides, we have much less destructive fishing methods than the EU boats and we don’t have any discard. The 
foreign boats from the EU…use bottom trawls, destroying the habitats and our cages too…The agreement with 
the EU does not specify how much they can take, only how many boats they can have here. Naturally they take 
as much as they can” (quoted in Cullberg and Lövin 2009: 5-6). CFFA (2006) claimed that unlike the EU 
vessels which target octopus, the artisanal octopus fishery is highly selective, using pots that allow juveniles and 
gravid females to be released, resulting in higher quality catches attracting higher prices than do trawlers.  
 
However, such criticism of the role of EU vessels in over-exploiting the octopus fishery is contestable. For one 
thing, the artisanal octopus fishery has not suffered but thrived under the FPA, by developing into a niche 
fishery because of its cost-effective fishing methods (UNDP 2006). For another thing, the mismanagement of 
the artisanal octopus fishery was responsible for at least some of the over-exploitation. Interviewee 1 (2010) said 
that “there is some kind of un-trust…on both sides…because…Mauritanian authorities…leave the door open to 
over-exploitation. So it is not…as simple as describing one as the victim of over-exploitation and the other one 
as the exploitative actor…there is a lot of un-transparency, there is a lot of corruption and people just sell 
licences to whoever pays for it”. 
  
With regard to other species, although the Scientific Committee reported that the two shrimp species Penaeus 
notalis and Parapenaeus longirostris were fully exploited and that fishing efforts on these species should not be 
increased (CSC 2008), licences for crustaceans granted to EU vessels were increased by the 2006-2008 FPA 
Protocol from 6000 to 9440 GT and to 9570 GT in the current Protocol. However, following a recommendation 
to freeze the targeting of hake to 2006 levels due to the overexploitation of two black hake species (CSC 2008), 
licences granted to the EU for black hake were reduced from 8500 GRT in 2006 to 3240 GT in the 2008-2012 
Protocol. With regard to pelagic species, fishing effort on Atlantic horse mackerel (Trachurus trachurus) was 
found to overshoot the capacity of the stock by 31 %, while the stock of Cunene horse mackerel (Trachurus 
trecea) was judged to be fully exploited. Round sardinella was held to be overexploited, with an estimated 
annual catch for the north east African zone of 351,000 tonnes compared with a sustainable level of 220,000 
tonnes (CSC 2008)  
 
However, Mauritania may be criticised for consenting to selling its fisheries for short-term aid money. For 
example, Failler (2004: 7) accused the country of sacrificing its fishing industry for aid: “there is an ecological 
dumping happening, or a selling off of marine resources which reinforces economic development by relying on 
over-exploitation of natural resources…the concept of sustainable development receives not much more 
attention than lip service”. Furthermore, Mauritania has failed to keep track of the number of its own and 
Sengalese vessels targeting its fisheries resources. Interviewee 3 (2010) said that the Mauritanian fleet is “a 
totally unmanaged pirogue fleet. They don’t even know how many boats there are. There is no registry, at least 
not a working registry…[There is] free influx of Senegalese fishermen…The size of the fleet is totally 
unknown”. Interviewee 2 (2010) stated that the agreement between Senegal and Mauritania only covers  about 
300 vessels, yet, according to Interviewee 2 (2010), 1,000 Sengalese vessels actually fish in Mauritania’s EEZ.    
 
4.4 Compliance (Strategic Priority 4: ‘Reform of the legal and institutional framework’) 
 
EU vessel skippers have been accused of lack of compliance with regulations, including falsifying catch 
declarations, and over-quota catches of juveniles, especially octopus (CFFA 2006). Failler (2004) blamed 
Mauritanian enforcement mechanisms for being inadequate, but the EU bears some responsibility for failing to 
discipline its own vessels. However, satellite monitoring of EU vessels operating under the FPAs has been 
introduced, more stringent technical measures have been laid down, and biological recovery periods have been 
8 
 
set. Indeed, Interviewee 4 (2010) claimed that of all fleets operating in the EEZ of Mauritania, the EU fleet is 
the one that is now monitored best. If negotiations for a post-2012 agreement fail, it is likely that new bilateral 
agreements will emerge (e.g., between Spain and Mauritania and/or between the PFA and Mauritania) in which 
there will be less monitoring than in the current EU-Mauritanian FPA.   
 
Moreover, in defence of the EU, according to the Pelagic Freezer-trawler Association (PFA) 
2
 and the European 
Commission, the EU pelagic fishery in Mauritanian waters is exemplary (Obaidullah and Osinga 2010; 
Interview 4 2010). Interviewee 3 (2010) held that the EU pelagic fleet in Mauritanian waters (unlike the EU 
demersal fleet) was not in competition with Mauritanian vessels since there was no Mauritanian industrial 
pelagic fleet, partly because industrial pelagic boats were too expensive for Mauritanians to buy, and partly 
because they were too big to land in Mauritanian ports. Interviewee 3 (2010) also noted that EU vessels made up 
only one third of the pelagic boats fishing in Mauritania’s EEZ, the remaining two thirds coming from Iceland, 
Norway, Belize, Russia, and China, and that the PFA paid for scientific assessment of Mauritania’s pelagic 
stocks. Furthermore, Interviewee 3 (2010) said that the Commission was so determined to increase EU 
payments to Mauritania, that in the 2006 FPA, it inflated the catch target for pelagic species far beyond the scale 
that the EU vessels needed to catch: “Why the Commission put so much pelagic fish into this equation was not 
that they thought we could catch it. It was [because]…they wanted a kind of legitimation of the huge amounts of 
money to be paid to Mauritania”.  
 
4.5 Development of the Mauritanian fishing industry (Strategic Priority 2: ‘Increased economic and social 
impact of the sector’)  
 
A frequent indictment of the EU-Mauritanian FPA is that it did not develop the Mauritanian fishing industry. As 
we have seen, an increasing part of the compensation package has been earmarked to support the Mauritanian 
fishing industry. However, precisely how much of the money has actually been utilised for this purpose is  
unclear. A study published by UNDP (2006) concluded that the fishery sector of Mauritania was locked "into a 
position of raw material supplier rather than fish processor", and this has had four negative effects: decoupling 
of the production system from the Mauritanian economy; nil investment in indigenous processing plants; lack of 
fish (especially high value fish) in local markets; and replacement of traditional fish species by lower value 
species, and as a result, the EU “surely but slowly outcompetes Mauritanian fleets" (UNDP 2006: 4, 9). 
 
The EU is charged with three specific shortcomings: inadequate landing of fish in Mauritanian ports; export 
restrictions; and lack of investment in infrastructure. On fish landings, Interviewee 1 (2010) claimed that the EU 
was “really exploiting Mauritanian resources…to Europe’s benefit, because all the value adding is done in 
Europe”. In 2006, only 12% of catches in Mauritanian waters were processed in the country (UNDP 2006). In 
the 2001-2006 Agreement, EU vessels targeting demersal species were obliged to land their catches a total of 70 
times in Nouadihibou, but the 2008-2012 Protocol to the 2006-2012 Agreement replaced that obligation with an 
economic incentive of a 25% reduction of licence fees for those vessels which landed at least 15% of their 
catches in Mauritania (Martin 2010). However, despite this economic incentive, catches are not generally landed 
in Mauritania but in Las Palmas or Lanzarote, because of the poor infrastructure of the Nouadihibou harbour 
(Interview 1 2010). A representative of the European Commission (Interview 4 2010) explained that the EU 
wanted to land catches of EU vessels in Mauritania as often as possible, but that as long as the infrastructure was 
not sufficiently developed, EU vessel owners could not be forced to land their catches in Mauritanian harbours. 
However, EU pelagic vessels landed their catches almost exclusively in other African countries: “The fish we 
catch in Mauritania…goes…mostly to Africa. I think 99-100% go to Nigeria, Togo, those countries…south of 
Mauritania” (Interviewee 3 2010).  
 
On export restrictions, the EU was accused of blocking exports of fish and fish products from Mauritania to EU 
countries on safety grounds. Indeed, Doherty (2010) claimed that food safety measures under the sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary (SPS) regulations were replacing tariff barriers to European markets. Although a report following 
the inspection of the European Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) in Mauritania concluded that fishery products 
exported from Mauritania were unlikely to represent an immediate health risk to European consumers, a 
medium- to long-term health risk was identified by the EU inspectors in the cephalopod fishery due to the 
absence of monitoring of environmental contaminants in its fishery products (Food and Veterinary Office 2006). 
SPS regulations raise three difficulties for Mauritania: (1) cost - compliance with the EU’s SPS requirements is 
expensive; (2) complexity - fish exporters in West African countries find it hard to cope with SPS regulations 
because they are very complicated (CTA 2006); and (3) interpretation - some inspectors of the FVO expect 
                                                          
2 The PFA is a body which represents the interests of nine European pelagic fishing companies belonging to the Netherlands, 
the UK, France, Ireland, Germany and Lithuania.  
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systems that reflect the practices used in the EU and do not accept different systems that might achieve the same 
ends, so foreign consultancies have to be employed to ensure the ‘right’ interpretation (Doherty 2010). 
Nevertheless, 66 out of a total of 80 processing facilities in Mauritania are recognized by the EU as complying 
with SPS standards, and as a result, Mauritania is on the list of countries from which the import of fish products 
to the EU is authorized (Lesourd 2009).  
On infrastructure investment, Table 1 indicates that parts of the earmarked payments of the 2006-2012 FPA 
were scheduled to improve fishery infrastructure in Mauritania. However, a representative of the European 
Commission (Interview 4 2010) acknowledged that the earmarked payments would be too low to significantly 
improve the infrastructure. Furthermore, a representative of a European NGO (Interview 1) indicated that the 
way in which earmarked payments were granted to Mauritania was a barrier to investment in the fishery sector. 
For example, uncertainty existed about the amount of money that it actually received from the agreements, since 
that amount could easily change due to renegotiation and the cancelling or modification of fishing opportunities. 
As a result, the budget was not spent in the form of long-term investments but rather used to cover running 
costs.  
 
4.6 Good governance (wider criteria of partnership) 
 
Finally, the EU’s handling of the EU-Mauritania FPA has been attacked for not living up to the EU’s much-
vaunted claims of transparency and participatory governance. For example, CFFA (2006) drew attention to the 
lack of transparency in the way in which priorities for spending the EU compensation funds were decided, and 
suggested that the PFA Joint Committee should include representatives from both the Mauritanian fisheries 
sector, and civil society organizations. Interviewee 1 (2010) accused the EU of perpetuating a mirage of 
stakeholder participation in decision-making: “at some moments some fishermen get invited but it’s…very 
talkanistik because they…don’t receive the paper in advance…[They are merely] observers…[This is] not really 
participation”. These attacks are based on wider criteria of partnerships which are not in the FPAs but in many 
commentators’ perceptions of the purpose of partnerships (Brinkerhoff, JM, 2007). 
 
5. Discussion and recommendations 
 
Summing up the arguments on the six controversial issues in section 4, it seems that the subsidies paid to EU 
vessels have greatly diminished since the inception of the FPA; that the blame for over-exploiting Mauritania’s 
fisheries resources cannot be laid wholly at the EU’s door; and that EU vessels have become more compliant 
with fisheries regulations, though shortage of reliable data is a serious problem. However, the level of 
compensation provided by the EU hardly matches the resource loss suffered by Mauritania; the EU’s 
performance in strengthening Mauritania’s indigenous fishing industry (especially the processing sector) has 
been poor; and the EU has made very little impact in achieving any of the wider partnership goals of good 
governance. The truth is that the FPA has been more beneficial for the EU than for Mauritania. This may well 
explain the growing resentment felt by Mauritanians towards the EU (Green 2008).  
 
One of the reasons for these flaws lies in what was omitted from the 2008 EU-Mauritania FPA. For example, 
nothing is explicitly stated about the characteristics of partnerships (several of which appear in the EU-ACP 
partnership agreement) such as “mutual respect, equal participation in decision making…as opposed to 
domination by one or more partners…mutual accountability, and transparency” (Brinkerhoff, JM, 2002: 325) 
which are regarded by commentators as preconditions of a genuine partnership (Brinkerhoff, DW, 2007). 
Poncelet’s inclusive picture of the way partnerships work seems very far from the restricted picture painted by 
the 2008 FPA: “In partnerships…decision making and implementation are jointly undertaken, power is shared, 
and participants take collective responsibility for results. Partnerships also demand a high degree of 
commitment, participation, trust, and respect among the partners” (Poncelet 2004: 2). Also missing from the 
2008 FPA are the ‘transformative’ effects which partnerships can have on partners through social learning and 
cultural production – effects which, according to Poncelet (2004), include feelings of integration, solidarity, 
comradeship, togetherness, belonging, a bonding process generating an esprit de corps, harmony, social 
cohesion, collective unity, and identity change, and according to Stewart and Gray (2009) include the 
empowerment of previously excluded people. Omission of these wider criteria means that the EU has less to live 
up to 
3
. yet in the literature, the main criticism of partnerships is that they fail to live up to these broader criteria 
                                                          
3
 It is worth noting that the European Commission appears to be recommending the inclusion of some of these aspirations in 
future FPAs (EC 2011), though Member States who want references included in the FPA to the rule of law, democratic 
principles, and human rights, are not thinking of improving the governance of the partnership, but of pressurising Mauritania 
to improve the quality of its governance (Murias 2011c). 
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(Meadowcroft 2007; Stewart and Gray 2009; Darlow and Newby 1997; Biermann et al 2007a; Johnson and 
Wilson 2006; Backstrand 2006). Omission of these wider criteria means that the EU has less to live up to.  
 
Another reason for the flaws in the FPA is that the two parties have very different interpretations of the purpose 
of the partnership. These differences are starkly revealed on the issue of earmarked payments. The Mauritanian 
government’s interpretation is that since the fisheries resources belong to Mauritania, she can sell access to them 
and dispose of the payments as she sees fit: this is the country’s right as a matter of national sovereignty. 
Moreover, the fisheries sector is not a top priority for the country – Mauritania does not have a strong cultural 
tradition of fishing, and there are other sectors that need investment more urgently. This stance may, however, 
be in breach of UNCLOS, involving the country selling resources that are not in surplus but could be used by 
local people. The EU’s interpretation is that the payments for its vessels’ access to Mauritanian fisheries 
resources are the access dues and licence fees, and that the earmarked sums are extra payments to support 
Mauritania’s indigenous fisheries sector and sustainable fishing in the country’s EEZ as the EU’s contribution to 
the partnership. This thesis entails that €60 million per year is paid for the fish, while an additional €16 million 
is paid for the maintenance of the resource.  
 
A further reason for the flaws in the FPA is that since it is a bilateral rather than a multilateral partnership 
agreement – i.e. it is negotiated between the EU and individual states, not groups of states – the EU retains its 
dominant position (Stilwell et al 2010; Cullberg and Lövin 2009). This domination may be discursive rather 
than financial – i.e. where one side’s discourse is hegemonic and there is little common ground or consensus 
between the parties (Visseren-Hamakers et al 2007). Such power inequalities “vitiate the egalitarian pretensions 
of partnerships” (Meadowcroft 2007: 197) and weaken their performance (Brinkerhoff, DW, 2007). Indeed, in 
the case of a dominant power such as the EU, partnerships may even violate the right of self-determination of 
the weaker party by forcing it to conform to the priorities of the EU agenda (Slocum-Bradley and Bradley 
2010). A symptom (and a cause) of this inequality is the FPA’ lack of inclusivity. It is an agreement 
administered by two governmental bodies (the EU and the Mauritanian government) and does not include, for 
example, representatives of civil society in its membership. As a result, NGOs and other civil society 
organisations groups are treated as lobby groups rather than partners (Visseren-Hamakers et al 2007), and their 
voices are marginalised in decision-making processes, so important issues such as the socio-economic impact of 
the FPA were not given due consideration. 
  
However, this unequal power relationship may change as result of the recent discovery of oil reserves in the 
Mauritanian EEZ (Gascuel et al 2007). In February 2010, an offshore oilfield about 44 miles from Nouakchott 
began oil production of about 75,000 barrels per day, the revenue from which makes the EU fishing payments 
pale into insignificance (Obaidullah and Osinga 2010). An alternative way by which the relationship between 
the EU and Mauritania could be rebalanced is by collective action. Cullberg and Lövin (2009) recommends 
regional cooperation between West African states to renegotiate together their FPAs with the EU, though the 
heavy administrative work involved would require considerable outside help, perhaps from sympathetic NGOs. 
 
More specific recommendations for reform of Mauritania’s FPA include the following. First, the issue of access 
should be separated from the issue of aid so that the amount of access depended on the health of the stocks, 
whereas the amount of aid (or compensation) depended on what was needed by Mauritania to develop its 
fisheries industry, so there would no longer be an incentive to Mauritania to grant licences that would surpass 
the carrying capacity of its fishing resources (Gorez 2006). However, according to Interviewee 4 (2010), far 
from reducing pressure on fisheries resources, this could result in the EU refusing to pay the earmarked 
payments without the risk of losing its fishing licences in Mauritania. Second, EU payments which are 
earmarked for developing Mauritania’s domestic fishing industry should be used for that purpose – especially 
funding for catching gear, processing plants, fish products transport facilities, hygiene provisions, traceability 
systems, and training programmes (Gorez 2006). In March 2011, the EU Fisheries Commissioner, Maria 
Damanaki, pledged that a Trust Fund would be set up for just such a purpose (Murias 2011a). Third, the 
European Parliament recommended (as stipulated by UNCLOS) EU vessels’ access to Mauritanian fisheries 
should be restricted to surplus resources (Murias 2011b), though precisely how such a ‘surplus’ would be 
measured is unclear. Fourth, hird, the EU should allocate more funds to improve the quality and quantity of 
stock assessment data collected by scientists on Mauritanian fisheries, and to increase the effectiveness of 
surveillance and monitoring of EU fishing vessel activity. Fifth, the process of indigenising or ‘Mauritainising’ 
the country’s fishing industry should be speeded up to help fulfil the wider partnership criterion of capacity-
building (Obaidullah and Osinga 2010). To facilitate this process of indigenisation, there could be an extension 
of the coastal areas reserved for artisanal fishing which have doubled the octopus catch (Gorez 2006). Also, 
there could be greater involvement of Mauritanian fishers’ representatives in the decision-making processes of 
the FPA. All of these recommendations could be accomplished within the existing FPA framework.  
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However, might Mauritania not be better off if its FPA with the EU were ended altogether rather than reformed 
along these lines? Significantly, a report from MRAG claimed that “fisheries management has improved in 
those countries that have actively refrained from signing an EU fisheries agreement, both in cases where a 
country has never entered an agreement (Namibia) and where an agreement has been terminated (Mozambique). 
In other words, an EU agreement can delay the development of good local fisheries management” (quoted in 
Cullberg and Lövin 2009: 42). However, the ending of EU’s FPA with Mauritania would not necessarily 
improve the situation for the country if it had to negotiate fisheries agreements separately with individual 
Member States or with other players such as Russia or China. Dziemballa (2011) claims that for its part, the EU 
is unhappy with the cost of the four ‘mixed’ (ie multi-species) FPAs (which include Mauritania) which is much 
higher than the cost of the 11 tuna-only FPAs, and is contemplating ending them, offloading EU vessels to the 
third countries, thereby improving their local economies through technology transfer. However, one should not 
underestimate the pressure that some European stakeholders would put on the European Commission to 
continue the agreement: as Interviewee 4 (2010) put it, “In the case of Mauritania, the Member States would 
break your neck”. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In the light of this analysis, it seems that while the EU-Mauritanian Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) 
fulfils some, but by no means all, of its stated objectives, it does not even begin to meet the wider criteria of 
what many commentators regard as a genuine (or ideal) partnership, because of both procedural defects (such as 
lack of transparency, stakeholder participation, accountability, and equality in its decision-making) and 
substantive failures (such as inadequate support for indigenous capacity-building for social capital, 
democratisation, and human rights in Mauritania). Nevertheless, in our view it is no longer an exploitative 
commercial contract, but a ‘partnership work in progress’, in that its successive formulations and Protocols are 
gradually improving the terms in Mauritania’s favour and reducing the disparity in power between the two 
parties. However, a more serious attempt must be made by the EU to meet the aspirations of the Mauritanian 
government in developing the country’s fishing industry by investing in schemes to extend and upgrade the 
processing sector; to improve the infrastructure of the ports to allow the unloading of catches from deep water 
vessels; and to protect the fisheries stocks. At the same time, measures must be taken to improve the governance 
performance of the FPA. Until and unless such moves are made by the European Commission, indicating its 
commitment to foster the vision of development held by its partner rather than to serve its own needs, it will risk 
rejection of the FPA by the Mauritanian government.  
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